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What impact has the Great Recession had on European firms? In 2008 and
2009, the European Union experienced a 14 percent decline in industrial
production, and a 15 percent decline in trade. Companies were hit hard, going
through an average 10 percent sales decline, and reducing their workforces
by 6 percent.
But the unique firm-level dataset compiled from the EFIGE survey shows that
not all firms were affected in the same way. Exporters contracted more than
non-exporters, while importers, and those that outsource some of their
production or have an affiliate suffered less of a decline. These findings raise
an important policy trade-off. While export-oriented strategies might improve
competitiveness, they also bring about a greater exposure to foreign crises.
However, outsourcing to other countries has distinct stabilisation benefits.
Dominant firms centrally placed in the technology, trade and ownership net-
work, fared better, but firms relying on external finance, and experiencing
financial constraints to growth, experienced greater sales declines.
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics. It is
supported by European governments and international corporations.
Bruegel’s aim is to contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in
Europe through open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and
discussion.
EFIGE (European Firms in a Global Economy) is a project to examine the pat-
tern of internationalisation of European firms. The research leading to this
report has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework
Programme, and from UniCredit Group.
Still standing:
how European firms
weathered the crisis
The third EFIGE policy report
BY GÁBOR BÉKÉS, LÁSZLÓ HALPERN, MIKLÓS KOREN
AND BALÁZS MURAKÖZY 
BRU EGE L  BLU E P R I N T  1 5
9 789078 910237
ISBN 978-90-78910-23-7
33, rue de la Charité, Box 4, 1210 Brussels, Belgium
www.bruegel.org €15
efige covers:Mise en page 1  22/12/2011  09:30  Page 1
Still standing: how
European ﬁrms
weathered the crisis
The third EFIGE policy report
BY GÁBOR BÉKÉS, LÁSZLÓ HALPERN, MIKLÓS KOREN
AND BALÁZS MURAKÖZY
BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT SERIES
BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT SERIES
Volume XV
Still standing: how European firms weathered the crisis – the third EFIGE policy report
Gábor Békés, László Halpern, Miklós Koren and Balázs Muraközy
©Bruegel 2011. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted
in the original languagewithout explicit permission provided that the source is acknowledged. TheBruegel
Blueprint Series is published under the editorial responsibility of Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director of Bruegel.
Opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone.
Editor: Stephen Gardner
Production: Michael T. Harrington
Cover graphic: Jean-Yves Verdu
BruEGEl
33, rue de la Charité, Box 4
1210 Brussels, Belgium
www.bruegel.org
ISBN: 978-9-078910-23-7
EFIGE is a project designed to help identify the internal policies needed to improve
Europe’s external competitiveness.
Project funded under the Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities Programme
LEGAL NOTICE: The research leading to this report has received funding from the European Community’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 225551, and fromUniCredit
Group. The surveywas conducted byGFK Eurisko. The views expressed in this publication are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.
EFIGE PArTNErS
The leaders of the eight teams are: Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, Bocconi University, for Bruegel;
Lionel Fontagné, PSE, University of Paris I, for CEPII; Karen Helene Ullveit-Moe, University of
Oslo, for CEPR; László Halpern for the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Giorgio Barba Navaretti,
University of Milan, for Ld’A; Claudia Buch, University of Tübingen, for IAW; Andrea Brasili for
UniCredit; Klaus Desmet for University Carlos III Madrid. Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Gianmarco I.P.
Ottaviano and Thierry Mayer (PSE, CEPII and CEPR) coordinate the teams. Delphine Michel,
Bruegel, is the project manager. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences (IEHAS) was the partner
responsible for the preparation of this report.
The authors would like to thank Gianmarco Ottaviano, Jean Pisani-Ferry and the participants in
ERWIT'10 (European ResearchWorkshop in International Trade) and the European Trade Study
Group for their comments on a preliminary version of this report, and István Ilyés and Eniko˝
Gábor for excellent research assistance.
Institute
for Applied
Economic Research
Contents
About the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1 Scope of this report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
2 The crisis and heterogeneous ﬁrms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
3 Employment adjustments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
4 Trade and crisis transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
5 Supply chains and the crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
6 Financial constraints during the crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
7 Fiscal policy and the crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
8 Conclusions for policymakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
Appendix C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
Appendix D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
vii
About the authors
Gábor Békés is a research fellow at the Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy
of Sciences (IEHAS). His research is focused on applied work in international
economics, economic geography, location choice ofmanufacturing ﬁrms, foreign direct
investment, and ﬁrm innovation, internationalisation and productivity. He received his
PhD in 2007 from the Central EuropeanUniversity. He holds anMSc in Economics from
the London School of Economics and an MSc in Finance from Corvinus University
Budapest. He teaches economic geography and regional policy. Before joining IEHAS,
he was a visiting researcher at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and worked for Lehman
Brothers in London.
László Halpern is senior research fellow and deputy director of IEHAS. He is a research
fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and recurrent visiting
professor at the Central European University. He has written widely on exchange rate
theory, central and eastern European exchange rate policies, macroeconomic
stabilisation theory, enterprise behaviour and international trade. He has advised
diﬀerent Hungarian governmental agencies. He has participated in numerous
international research projects supported by the European Commission.
Miklós Koren is assistant professor in the Department of Economics of the Central
European University, a research fellow at IEHAS and a research aﬃliate at CEPR. His
research interests are international trade and economic growth. His research focuses
on the ﬁrm-level eﬀects of imported inputs and importedmachinery, the dynamics of
export ﬂows in disaggregate data, and the diversiﬁcation of volatility across trading
partners. He received his PhD from Harvard University in 2005. He also holds an MA
fromCentral European University (2000) and a BA fromCorvinus University Budapest
(1999). Before coming to the Central European University, he worked at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and at Princeton University.
Balázs Muraközy is a research fellow at IEHAS. He received his MA (2003) and PhD
(2008) in economics from Central European University. His main research interests
are the behaviour of ﬁrms, internationalisation and regulation. His research focuses on
export dynamics, the role of quality and innovation in exports and the determinants of
ﬁrmgrowth. He has taught several courses inmicroeconomics, innovation and applied
econometrics. He also has a regular column on economic and policy questions in
Magyar Narancs, a Hungarian weekly.
EFIGE REPORT III ABouT ThE AuThorS
viii
Foreword
With this publication, which follows on from the preceding report The global operations
of European firms by Giorgio Barba Navaretti and his colleagues (Bruegel Blueprint No
12, July 2011), the EFIGE project continues to bear fruits. Numerous research papers
arising from the project (European Firms in a Global Economy) are in the process of
being published in economic journals, and another policy report is already being
prepared. All this output is based on the evidence gathered through the EFIGE survey
of about 15,000 European ﬁrms in seven countries conducted in 2009.
The research output conﬁrms the strength of the approach underpinning the project,
which is based on the recognition that ﬁrms are heterogeneous in the extent and the
pattern of their internationalisation, as they are inmany other respects. EFIGE provides
more, andmore precise, evidence of what makes ﬁrms successful and therefore also
what makes countries successful in the context of globalisation.
Internationalisation, however, also makes ﬁrms vulnerable to shocks aﬀecting
international trade and may transform them into agents of propagation of global
downturns. At the time of the Great Recession of 2009, there was intense speculation
about the reasons why trade collapsed much more than output. It was sometimes
claimed that global supply chains were not only propagators, but also multipliers of
international ﬂuctuations.
This report by László Halpern and his colleaguesmakes use of the fact that the EFIGE
surveywas– by accident – conducted in 2009 and–by design – included questions
about the ﬁrms’ response to the global crisis. It provides a fascinating account of what
happened to them in an especially turbulent environment, showing for example that
a minority of ﬁrms managed to fare very well in spite of headwinds, and that their
individual characteristics and their position in global supply chains both playedmajor
roles in determining their performance and their employment behaviour. This ﬁnding
is reminiscent of a familiar insight from the analysis of labour markets: even in the
worst possible macroeconomic conditions, some ﬁrms increase their payrolls and
some individuals succeed in getting access to better jobs.
ix
The stylised facts presented in this report are important to bear inmind at a timewhen
Europe is heading for another severe downturn and when many ﬁrms, especially the
smaller ones, are facing increasing diﬃculties getting access to credit.
The challenge now for the EFIGE team is to spell out the policy implications of its factual
ﬁndings. Throughout Europe and beyond, governments are putting increased
emphasis on competitiveness and growth. But eﬀective policies require a proper
understanding of what determines international performance. This especially applies
to southern European countries, where the traded-goods sectors has shrunk in relative
terms as a consequence of domestic credit booms and must now attract resources
and expand.
For sure, policies that increase the stock of knowledge, foster human capital formation,
improve labour-market institutions andmake capitalmarketsmore eﬃcient are called
for. But the analysis of heterogeneous ﬁrms suggests that measures that would help
ﬁrms just below the threshold of internationalisation to pass it, and ﬁrms already active
in international markets to expand their reach, would do more for competitiveness
than across-the-board, indiscriminate measures. This should not be an argument for
‘picking thewinners’, rather to ﬁndways to help ‘fatten the tail’ of globally competitive
ﬁrms. How to achieve this goal in a non-discretionary, non-distortive way is what
economic research should now help shed light on.
Research reported in this volume was supported by the European Commission’s
Seventh Framework Programme, and the data collectionwas also funded byUniCredit,
which had pioneered similar work in Italy. We are very grateful to these institutions for
their support and conﬁdence.
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director of Bruegel,
December 2011
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1. For further details see http://www.eﬁge.org/.
Executive summary
The Great Recession of 2008 and 2009 brought about a 6.5 percent decline in world
industrial production and a 12.8 percent decline in world merchandise trade in 2009,
with even sharper declines during late 2008 and early 2009. Europe was particularly
aﬀected. Industrial production andmerchandise trade in the EuropeanUnion declined
by 13.7 and 15 percent, respectively. The unemployment rate peaked at just below
10 percent at the end of 2009. Businesses, policymakers and academics alike would
like to understand the causes and the consequences of the crisis, with the hope of
avoiding or mitigating future ones.
This report asks how the Great Recession impacted European ﬁrms. In addressing this
question, we rely on the EFIGE survey, which asked a total of 14,444 ﬁrms in seven
countries about their performance, their modes of internationalisation, their employ-
ment decisions, their ﬁnancing structure and their competitive environment, among
other topics1. The countries covered were Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Spain and theUnitedKingdom. The countries diﬀermarkedly not only in their economic
environments, but also in the policy responses applied during 2008 and 2009. This
provides an ideal test bed for analysing the eﬀect of the crisis.
A panel of questions in the survey dealt speciﬁcally with the crisis and ﬁrms’ responses
to it. The key outcome variables that ﬁrms reported are the percentage reduction (if any)
insalesbetween2008and2009, thepercentage reductionofexportsand thepercentage
change in employment. The survey proves that the crisis hit ﬁrmshard: on average, they
reported a 12 percent decline in sales and laid oﬀ six percent of their employees.
The survey shows that these averages disguise signiﬁcant heterogeneity across
countries and ﬁrms in terms of how they were aﬀected by, or responded to, the crisis.
Despite a synchronised, substantialmacro-economic shock, the response of ﬁrmswas
rather diverse and some ﬁrms did well in 2009 even in the hardest hit industries and
regions.
1
Identifying which ﬁrms suﬀered the most from the crisis is important for at least two
reasons. First, we can identify which ﬁrms are most vulnerable in another crisis with
a similar nature. Second, we can evaluate the policy responses that were implemented
in the midst of the crisis with limited information about the scope and nature of the
events. Identifying ﬁrms that fared better may help designmore eﬀective and better-
targeted policies.
While a temporary reduction in outputmay beweathered by ﬁrms, the loss of jobs has
more long-lasting eﬀects. Firmswith a greater drop in sales also laid oﬀmoreworkers,
but the relationshipwas less than proportional. Whilewedonot have information about
which workers were laid oﬀ, there were more lay-oﬀs at ﬁrms with many part-time
employees and many unskilled workers. This suggests that during crises ﬁrms try to
protect the human capital embodied in skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers,
while some types of workers are seen asmore easily replaceable should the recovery
arrive.
Exporters contracted more than non-exporters. The average exporter suﬀered a 3.2
percentage points greater decline in sales than the average non-exporter within the
same country. However, some of this diﬀerence boils down to structural diﬀerences
between countries. When controlling for industry and size class, this diﬀerence is
reduced to 2.5 percentage points. The diﬀerence in the sales decline between
exporters and non-exporters was greatest in Austria, Germany and France.
One ﬁrm’s exports are another ﬁrm’s imports. Do trade linkages exacerbate the crisis
or do they just transmit shocks from one country to another? Our next result is that
importers and ﬁrms that outsourced some of their production were somewhat
insulated from the shock of the crisis. The revenues of importers declined by 0.8
percentage points less than those of non-importers in the same country, industry and
size category.
Taken together, it becomes clear that international trade is important in the trans-
mission of the crisis, but some trade linkages may enable the ﬁrm to respond more
ﬂexibly to demand shocks. This ﬁnding raises the possibility of additional gains from
trade and globalisation in core European countries.Well-established and deep linkages
with other countries may help spread the risk associated with a sudden drop in
demand such as the one seen in 2008-09.
Firms that outsource, and ﬁrms that control other companies, fared better during the
crisis. Outsourcers saw a 1.8 percentage points smaller reduction in sales. Firms in a
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controlling position within their company network laid oﬀ 1.3 percent fewer workers.
By contrast, employment in ﬁrms that are controlled by other companies declined by
up to an extra 4.2 percent. This suggests that the place of the ﬁrm in the production
chain is an important determinant of the eﬀect of the crisis.We also conﬁrm this ﬁnding
with technological indices: industries that sell mostly to other industries have
contracted more.
Given the ﬁnancial nature of the crisis, it is natural to look at how ﬁrms in diﬀerent
ﬁnancial positions fared. Based on the survey, ﬁrms with self-reported ﬁnancial
constraints contracted more during the crisis. Because the survey questions were
retrospective (ﬁrms were asked in late 2009/early 2010 about perceived ﬁnancial
constraints in 2008), it is diﬃcult to establish a causal relationship between these
ﬁnancial indicators and performance. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms in industries
with a greater reliance on collateralised property contracted more.
A key policy response in many of the countries was aggressive ﬁscal stimulus. This
should have had a greater eﬀect on ﬁrms that were already serving the public sector.
Indeed, ﬁrms with public clients suﬀered a six percent less sales decline. This eﬀect
wasmuchweaker in Hungary, which had little wiggle room in ﬁscal policy, and the UK,
where the ﬁscal stimulus was largely tax-based.
An important theme, suggested by the ﬁndings of this report, is that dominant ﬁrms,
centrally placed in the technology, trade and ownership network, fared better. Firms
producing ﬁnal goods, non-client speciﬁc goods and relying on a stable pool of skilled
workers maintained higher sales. Similarly, relying on a network of suppliers (be it
through importing or outsourcing) alsomitigated the eﬀect of the crisis. Finally, ﬁrms
controlling other companies at home or abroad were able to preserve more jobs.
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KEy FINDINGS
1. Despite a synchronised, substantial macro-economic shock, ﬁrms’ responses
were rather diverse and 10-20 percent of ﬁrms did well in 2009, even in the
hardest hit sectors and countries. However, ﬁrm size itself made no diﬀerence.
2. Firms reduced employment by a lesser degree than their sales decline, and ﬁrms
with relatively more skilled workers preserved more jobs.
3. Exporters contractedmore than non-exporters, while importers suﬀered less of
a decline.
4. Outsourcers and ﬁrms that control other companies fared somewhat better, while
ﬁrms relying on speciﬁc demand from others suﬀered more.
5. Firms relying on external ﬁnance and experiencing ﬁnancial constraints to growth
(before the crisis) experienced greater sales declines. Firms with greater pre-
crisis tangible assets or relying on local bank ﬁnance were particularly
constrained.
6. Expansionary ﬁscal policy bothmitigated the eﬀects of the crisis by supporting
general domestic demand and ensuring continued orders for ﬁrms supplying the
public sector.
1 Scope of this report
The Great Recession of 2008 and 2009 brought about a 6.5 percent decline in world
industrial production and a 12.8 percent decline in world merchandise trade in 2009,
with an even sharper decline during late 2008 and early 2009. Europewas particularly
aﬀected. Industrial production andmerchandise trade in the EuropeanUnion declined
by 13.7 and 15 percent, respectively. Businesses, policymakers and academics alike
would like to understand the causes and the consequences of the crisis, with the hope
of avoiding or mitigating future ones.
Most policy reports to date have analysed the macro-economic context of the crisis,
assessing the eﬀectiveness of countries’ ﬁscal or trade policies in restarting economic
growth. This report is diﬀerent because it asks how the Great Recession impacted
European ﬁrms. Using new data from seven European countries, the results shows
that there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity across countries and ﬁrms in terms of how they
were aﬀected by, or responded to, the crisis. Identifyingwhich ﬁrms suﬀered themost
from the crisis is important for at least two reasons. First, we can identify which ﬁrms
aremost vulnerable in another crisiswith a similar nature. Second, we can evaluate the
policy responses that were implemented in the midst of the crisis with limited
information about the scope andnature of the events. Identifying ﬁrms that fared better
may help design more eﬀective and better-targeted policies.
In addressing these questions, we rely on the EFIGE survey, which asked a total of
14,444 ﬁrms in seven countries about their performance, their modes of inter-
nationalisation, their employment decisions, their ﬁnancing structure and their
competitive environment, among other topics. The countries covered were Austria,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Data was collected
in 2010 and is representative ofmanufacturing sectors in each country. The countries
diﬀer markedly not only in their economic environments, but also in the policy
responses applied in 2008 and 2009. This provides an ideal test bed for analysing the
eﬀect of the crisis.
We investigate six issues pertaining to the eﬀect of crisis. We start by demonstrating
5
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the heterogeneity of responses in spite of a synchronized shock. We then look at the
employment aspect of ﬁrms’ reactions, and at features of ﬁrms that are active in
international trade. Ownership, networks and external ﬁnancing are also shown to have
played a role in response to the crisis. Finally, we look at howﬁscal policiesmight have
inﬂuenced ﬁrm performance.
After presenting a summary of key results, the report discusses these issues in detail.
For each issue, we ﬁrst note the key results to date, set out some hypotheses and
present results using this unique dataset. The conclusion relates our results to
opportunities in policy2.
2. In the appendiceswe provide the deﬁnition of the variables used in the report, present some descriptive statistics
and describe the estimation methods. For further details see http://www.eﬁge.org/.
2 The crisis and heterogeneous
ﬁrms
Aftermore than six years of positive trade growth in OECD countries, the value of trade
nose-dived in October 2008, reaching a record decline of 37 percent in April 2009.
Trade series suggest that the current collapse appears to be the sharpest in the
historical record. In the earlymonths aggregate-level patterns reﬂected the very strong
synchronisation of the trade collapse across countries. Using monthly trade data for
OECD countries, OlivieraMartins and Araujo (2009) ﬁnd that the average rate of decline
between October 2008 and June 2009 was 25 percent with countries experiencing
very strong concurrent drops in trade. With very few exceptions, OECD countries
simultaneously exhibited a decline in exports and imports exceeding 10 percent at
the end of 2008. There were no exceptions at the end of the 2009Q1.
Certain sectors suﬀeredmore during the crisis,meaning that countries inwhich these
sectors are prominent suﬀered more. In the OECD, the greatest decline was observed
in the following sectors:machinery and transport equipment,mineral fuels and related
products and chemicals and related products.
The crisismotivated diﬀerent lines of policy-oriented research aimed at understanding
ﬁrms’ reactions to this large shock. One question was whether the trade decline was
caused by the exit of exporting ﬁrms (extensive margin) or by the decline in exports
per ﬁrm (intensive margin). This is relevant for policy as these two margins can be
inﬂuenced by diﬀerent policy instruments and they may behave diﬀerently during
recession and boom. Another important question was if trade decline diﬀered across
industries or export markets.
Behrens et al (2010) found that for Belgium, the fall in trade overwhelmingly occurred
at the intensive margin (ﬁrst half of 2008 versus ﬁrst half of 2009). The intensive
margin fall was evenly spread across products. Almost all trading ﬁrms remained
active, with hardly any change in the average number of countries they traded with. It
was the fall in demand that was the main cause of the trade collapse, not the trade
7
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crisis per se. Behrens et al (2010) claim that therewas no diﬀerence across consumer
durables and capital goods in the intensive-margin decline. The same applies to
destination and origin markets: though the fall was slightly less pronounced for EU
partners and/or higher-growth countries, domestic sales and purchases fell equally
fast with no systematic variation across ﬁrms.
The same result is found for France by Bricongne et al (2011). The key ﬁndings are:
simultaneous drop inworld trade; trade drop caused by exporters not serving asmany
markets as before the crisis, and the intensive margin; there were no additional exits
of exporters compared to ‘good economic conditions’. The drop in the value shipped by
exporters may be quite evenly distributed. Firm-level adjustment took place at the
intensive margin.
In the French data, one part of this composition eﬀect comes from intermediate goods.
About one third of intensive-margin deterioration in exports is attributable to trade in
intermediate goods. Equipment goods (excluding aircraft) and the automobile industry
are the next two broad contributors. These ﬁgures are in linewith earlier estimates sug-
gesting that exports are about two to three times more volatile than GDP, owing to a
relatively larger share of durables (Engel and Wang, 2011).
Looking at 450 items at NAICS 6-digit industry level quarterly data for the US3,
Levchenko et al (2010) suggest that a trade collapse happened in durable and
intermediate goods, and trade recovery can be seen bymean reversion by sector and
partner country.
European ﬁrms faced a large and simultaneous macro-economic shock as the global
ﬁnancial crisis hit European banks and markets in late 2008. On average, sales
dropped by over 12 percent4. Exports declined marginally less in the sample – 11.6
percent – and the recession was accompanied by a 6.2 percent fall in employment.
Motivated by the previous ﬁndings, the EFIGE survey provides an opportunity to look
inmore detail into the heterogeneity of ﬁrm’s reactions to this simultaneous crisis. As
will be detailed in this section, there was a great deal of divergence from country to
country, industry to industry, and most importantly, ﬁrm to ﬁrm.
3. NAICS: North American Industry Classiﬁcation System.
4. Numbers ofmacro aggregates are calculated by using the survey data. They diﬀer from the oﬃcialmacro statistics
as the weighting to ensure representativeness at country level for size and industry does not necessarily lead to
similar numbers for the variables like growth rate of exports or sales. This is the inevitable consequence if themicro
observations of the survey are to be aggregated tomacro level. For example the export decline was smaller in our
sample than the oﬃcial data for Austria, Germany and the UK; larger for France, and very close for Hungary, Italy
and Spain.
First, there were substantial diﬀerences in country performances (see Figure 1). The
greatest declinewas experienced bySpanish ﬁrms, followedbyHungarian companies,
while companies in Austria and Germany suﬀered a relatively smaller decline. Indeed,
for ﬁrms in Austria, Germany and in the UK, the collapse of both sales and exports
remained belownine percent, while for the other countries it wasmore than12percent.
The gap between the sales and export declines is rather diﬀerent across countries,
with the gap close to zero in Austria, Germany and Italy, while for Spain and the UK the
sales decline exceeded signiﬁcantly the export decline. In France and Hungary the
opposite was the case.
Figure 1: Sales and export declines across countries
Source: EFIGE.
Second, sales decline was diﬀerent for ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries; all but the food
industry suﬀered a greater than 10 percent drop in sales (Figure 2). Cars, metals and
machinerywere hit themost, while electronics, light industry and other heavy industry
suﬀered marginally less.
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Figure 2: Average sales decline across industries
Source: EFIGE.
Finally, the statistics suggest that ﬁrmsize did notmatter on average; sales of diﬀerent
ﬁrm size categories fell by 10.8 to 12.6 percent.
A great strength of the EFIGE survey is that it allows us to look beyond averages, and
consider the diversity of responses regarding sales. This diversity is present both
within countries and industries. The average sales decline of 12.2 percent masks a
great degree of heterogeneity between ﬁrms: while sales of 18 percent of ﬁrms did
not decline, or even increased, nearly one ﬁfth of ﬁrms suﬀered substantial reductions
exceeding 30 percent.
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Fact 1a – Sales and exports declined at uneven rates across countries (greatest
declines in hungary and Spain, lowest in Austria and Germany) and industries (food
sector stayed stable, while metal production declined the most). Firm size did not
matter; small and large ﬁrms performed similarly.
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Table 1: Change in sales – all ﬁrms
Change % of firms
Large decline (over 30%) 18.1
Medium decline (between 10-30%) 34.4
Small decline (less than 10%) 19.1
No change or sales growth 28.4
Source: EFIGE.
We have seen the diversity of reaction across countries and industries. However, ﬁrm-
level performance is only partly determined by country and industry. A simple exercise
suggests5 that industry and country diﬀerences are less important than within-
industry/within-country heterogeneity in explaining ﬁrm-level performance. In terms
of variance in change in sales, industry aﬃliation explains 9.6 percent, and the country
of origin accounts for just 3.4 percent, together explaining only 13 percent of the total
variation. The remainder is a consequence of ﬁrm heterogeneity. For percentage
change in exports, these features explain 4.5 percent of variation only.
Many ﬁrms were able to prevent their sales from falling even in countries suﬀering a
great contraction, and, conversely, there were several ﬁrms facing a decline even in
economies faring relatively well (see Figure 3). Large declines were most frequently
experienced in Spain, while over a third of ﬁrms in Austria, Germany and the UK
experienced stable or rising sales. In terms of industries, the share of ﬁrms avoiding a
drop in sales ranged between 13 percent and 44 percent, while the share of ﬁrms
suﬀering a decline ranged between 63 percent and 82 percent.
5. Details of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) are available from authors on request.
Figure 3: Diversity of sales change across countries
Source: EFIGE.
Availability ofmore detailed datamakes it possible to illustrate the diversity of changes
in export sales. There was a wide variation in export performance, even among ﬁrms
that experienced some change (66 percent of exporting ﬁrms – see Figure 4). Firms
may react to the crisis along twomargins: exiting from the exportmarket altogether or
reducing their export volume, but continuing to export6.
In line with earlier ﬁndings, the data suggests strongly that the reaction on the
extensive margin was relatively small: 179 ﬁrms (2 percent of exporters in 2009)
reported that they exported previously, but not in 2009. The reaction on the intensive
margin, however, was much larger: exporting ﬁrms reduced their turnover by 11.6
percent, which is similar in magnitude to the decline in sales. This adjustment on the
intensive margin was also heterogeneous across ﬁrms: about 50 percent of ﬁrms
reduced their export volumes, and 19 percent increased them.
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6. Using Argentine data fromcrises periods, Gopinath andNeiman (2010) also ﬁnd that the extensivemargin deﬁned
as the entry and exit of ﬁrms or the entry and exit of products (at the country level) plays a small role in
understanding trade adjustment during the crisis. For imports, the number of ﬁrms that exit the import market is
large, but when weighted by value these exits explain a small share of the decline in imports.
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Figure 4: Distribution of change in exports – all ﬁrms
Source: EFIGE. Note: The spike at zero comes from the survey question: did your exports stayed unchanged, rise or
decline – and if changed, by howmuch?
Fact 1b – Firm-level heterogeneity is overwhelmingly present in all industries and
all countries, in terms of both overall sales and exports. more than 13 percent and
18 percent of ﬁrms were able to sustain or even increase their sales even in the
worst-hit industries (metal products) and countries (Spain), respectively.
3 Employment adjustments
Firms adjusted their employment to the decline in demand diﬀerently. In this section
we aim to understand how big this diﬀerence is and what explains it. Unfortunately
we see only the ﬁrst phase of the crisis and our data does not allow us to provide an
answer to what happens to laid-oﬀ workers when the recovery comes.
Firms have reduced their employment to a signiﬁcantly smaller extent than the
average fall in their sales. We explore this relationship by tabulating the decrease in
employment and the decrease in sales (see Table 2). The disproportionate presence
of ﬁrms below the diagonal demonstrates that in proportional terms the majority of
ﬁrms reduced employment less than the fall in demand. For example, about half of
ﬁrms facing a very large (more than 30 percent) decline in sales laid oﬀ less than 10
percent of their employees. This also reﬂects a highly heterogeneous reaction to the
fall in demand: even ﬁrms facing similar demand shocks adjusted their employment
levels – and presumably, their technological and organisational structures– in various
ways.
These signiﬁcant and systematic diﬀerences between ﬁrms suggest that policies and
ﬁrm-level characteristics may strongly aﬀect how much of the demand shock is
absorbed by adjusting employment versus restructuring production or declining
productivity. The relative importance of these two margins is fundamental for policy,
as it determines the labourmarket eﬀects of a crisis, andmay also aﬀect themedium-
term competitiveness of ﬁrms.
14
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Table 2: Tabulation of sales and employment change
Change in employment
More than
No change
0-10% 10-30%
30% Total
reduction reduction
reduction
No change 24.2% 2.9% 1.2% 0.2% 28.4%
Change in
0-10% reduction 11.9% 4.7% 2.1% 0.3% 19.1%
sales
10-30% reduction 14.3% 10.0% 8.6% 1.4% 34.4%
More than 30% reduction 5.1% 3.8% 5.9% 3.3% 18.2%
Total 55.6% 21.5% 17.8% 5.2% 100.0%
Source: EFIGE.
To study the heterogeneity of adjustment, we compare ﬁrms in the same industry
facing a similar fall in demand (proxied by the decline in sales– see Table 3 for results).
In particular, we look at change in employment when sales decline is held constant
(ie we control for the decline in saleswith a set of dummies in addition to the industry,
size and country dummies) with a number of ﬁrm-level variables. A positive relation-
ship suggests that an increase in the explanatory variables is associated with greater
employment growth (smaller employment decline).
We also address the question of the composition of employment, which may aﬀect
ﬁrm responses to the crisis: more qualiﬁed workers may have more ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital and may be costlier to replace.
The share of part-timeworkers is another dimension of the employment composition.
On the one hand, it can be easier to layoﬀ part-time workers; however, it may also be
relatively easy to reduce the time they work.
The role of short-time work (STW) has been extensively analysed by several authors.
Boeri and Bruecker (2011) present the case for short-time work in Europe arguing that
in the right institutional settingssuchmeasuresmay indeeddampen theeﬀectsof crises.
Indeed OECD data suggests that such measures may have helped create a greater
adjustment at the intensivemargin both compared to peers and to previous crises7.
7. For OECD countries, Boeri and Bruecker (2011) ﬁnd that STW contributes to reducing job losses especially when
output falls markedly (at least 2.6 percent) – which is the case for most countries in 2009. Micro-evidence for
Germany also conﬁrms the potential beneﬁts of STW.While the large deadweight costs detectedmaymodify policy
conclusions, the evidence for ﬁrms already relying on temporary work solutions is clear – such measures may
help adjustment at the hours-worked level rather than the head-count level.
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BoX 1: ShorT-TErm WorK SChEmES IN EuroPE
Before the crisis, access to short-term work (STW) schemes was largely limited to
workers with open-ended contracts or did not exist at all in some countries. As a
response to the crisis there was the introduction of (new) publicly-sponsored STW,
increased generosity, extended conditions of participation, extended duration, and
introduction of training incentives. As detailed by Arpaia et al (2010), many EU
countries temporarily introduced new publicly-sponsored STW or increased their
generosity (level, coverage and duration). For a limited period of time thismay have
helped stabilise employment levels and cushion social hardship. Both Germany and
Italy spent about €5 billion on schemes related to suchmeasures, with the aims of
preventing otherwise proﬁtable enterprises from going bankrupt and of preventing
unnecessary labour shedding.
Andersen (2011) argues that ﬂexible labour markets in terms of hiring and ﬁring will
result in a crisis having greater short-term impact. In Denmark, employment
adjustment is not particularly large by international comparison, but it is focused on
the extensive (number of employees), rather than on the intensive (hours) margin.
The results suggest the following conclusions. First, the decline in employment was
smaller than the decline in sales in each country. On average, a large (more than 30
percent) decline in sales is associated with 17.4 percent decline in employment
relative to ﬁrmswith stagnant or increasing sales. The numbers are 4.7 and9.2 percent
for ﬁrms facing sales declines of 0-10 and 10-30 percent, respectively. This
relationship is remarkably similar across countries: European ﬁrms were willing to
adjust both by sacriﬁcing labour productivity and by laying oﬀ workers.
Second, labour reduction was the greatest in Spanish ﬁrms, followed by British ones,
compared to ﬁrms facing similar demand shocks in Italy and Germany. These results
suggest that labour market institutions and policies aﬀected notably the adjustment
strategy of ﬁrms.
Third, ﬁrms are less willing to lay oﬀ skilled and especially white-collar workers. In our
sample 10 percentage point increase in the share of white collar employees increased
Fact 2a – on average, ﬁrms reduced their employment to a smaller extent than the
decline in their sales.
the overall employment by 0.19 percent on average. There are, however, some
diﬀerences across countries: skilled blue-collar workers were spared from layoﬀs in
Germany and Hungary, while ﬁrms with more white-collar workers reduced the
employment level to a lesser extent in Hungary and Italy.
Fourth, the share of part-time workers is negatively associated with employment
growth, suggesting that ﬁrms employing more part-time workers can lay them oﬀ
easier. When this relationship is examined on the country level, the share of part-time
workers is signiﬁcant for Spain only. This may indicate that the presence of part-time
workers aﬀected only the employment decisions of Spanish ﬁrms. Note, however, that
the share of part-timeworkers is the greatest in Spain (10 percent), and itmay be hard
to identify this eﬀect in other countries.
The relationship between the presence of part-time workers and layoﬀs requires
somewhat deeper analysis. The diﬀerence betweenﬁrmsemploying part-timeworkers
and ﬁrmsnot employing part-timeworkers by sales-decline categories is presented in
Figure 5. While the employment change for the two kinds of ﬁrms is similar for ﬁrms
with stagnating or increasing sales, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for ﬁrms with
declining sales. This diﬀerence seems to increase with the degree of sales decline.
This pattern is even strongerwhen the interaction of the sales-decline and the part-time
is included.
Figure 5: Part-time workers and labour decline
Source: EFIGE.
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Table 3: labour change and the composition of employment
Variables labour change (%)
All firms Austria France Germany Hungary Italy Spain UK
Part-time -0.047*** -0.002 0.028 -0.026 -0.013 -0.054 -0.082*** -0.003
employees (%) (0.011) (0.068) (0.04) (0.022) (0.058) (0.044) (0.018) (0.034)
Share of skilled 0.006 -0.013 0.005 0.024* 0.082** -0.001 -0.002 0.009
blue collars (%) (0.005) (0.041) (0.014) (0.013) (0.034) (0.012) (0.01) (0.013)
Share of white 0.019*** 0.037 -0.006 0.021 0.082* 0.065*** 0.035 0.003
collars & (0.007) (0.039) (0.016) (0.013) (0.044) (0.02) (0.025) (0.02)
executives (%)
Reduction in sales -17.4*** -24.353*** -18.333*** -16.892*** -15.708*** -14.051*** -20.024*** -19.888***
more than 30% (0.396) (2.81) (0.933) (0.821) (2.302) (0.879) (0.975) (1.121)
Reduction in sales -9.199*** -10.929*** -10.123*** -8.211*** -10.801*** -6.651*** -10.932*** -12.88***
up to 10-30% (0.326) (2.08) (0.716) (0.654) (1.923) (0.749) (0.881) (0.841)
Reduction in sales -4.75*** -10.955*** -5.364*** -4.688*** -3.642 -3.888*** -5.59*** -5.211***
up to 10% (0.361) (2.295) (0.865) (0.643) (2.33) (0.851) (1.011) (0.947)
Observations 11375 238 1979 2365 360 2274 2289 1870
R2 0.216 0.387 0.258 0.214 0.316 0.153 0.260 0.233
Dummies
Sector, country,
Sector, size Sector, size Sector, size Sector, size Sector, size Sector, size Sector, size
size
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are weighted by the sampling weights of firms.
The results relating to part-time workers suggest that ﬁrms employing part-time
workers laid oﬀmore workers than other ﬁrms facing a similar decline in demand. The
size of this eﬀect is not uniformacross ﬁrms: the greater the fall in demand, the greater
the eﬀect of the presence of part-time workers.
To conclude, substantial heterogeneity exists between the reactions of diﬀerent ﬁrms
hit by similar demand shocks. The reactions diﬀer across countries. The presence of
part-timeworkerswas associatedwith greater reductions in the number of employees.
Second, ﬁrms employing more skilled workers reduced their workforces less.
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Fact 2b – Firms employing skilled and permanent workers laid oﬀ fewer employees
compared to other ﬁrms faced with a similar fall in demand.
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4 Trade and crisis transmission
The trade linkages between EFIGE countries and the rest of the world contributed to a
more rapid transmission of shocks. In country- and industry-level data, this
transmission has been conﬁrmed by Oliviera Martins and Araujo (2009) and Bems et
al (2010), who found that global trade collapsed during the crisis in a simultaneous
manner across countries. There are several studies (eg Behrens et al, 2010; Bricongne
et al, 2011; and Gopinath and Neiman, 2010) analysing the trade response of ﬁrms
within individual countries. The emerging conclusion is that the sales of already-trading
ﬁrms have contracted by a signiﬁcant amount, and that there are quantitatively small
eﬀects on the extensive margin (the set of ﬁrms that trade).
Alessandria et al (2010) looked at the motor vehicles trade in the US with aggregate
and microdata for trade and inventories. In this sector, international trade declined
more drastically than trade-weighted production or absorption (drop in tradewas four
times the drop in output and 50 percent greater than the drop in industrial production
or trade-weighted demand) and inventory dynamics showed a sizable adjustment,
especially for imported goods. Given the overshooting nature of inventory manage-
ment, both output and trade are more responsive to shocks and are volatile when
inventories are important – a key issue for motor manufacturers. Trade is aﬀected
relatively more than output because importers hold more inventory than non-
importers.
Motivated by these previous studies, we look at the sales decline experienced byﬁrms
that are exporters, and contrast it to the dynamics of non-exporting ﬁrms. Exporter
status is identiﬁed through a question asking whether the ﬁrm exported some of its
output in 2008.
First we relate the change of total sales to the exporter status (see the ﬁrst column of
Table 4). We ﬁnd that the sales of exporters declined by 2.3 percentage points more
than those of non-exporters in the same country, sector and size class. The diﬀerence
in sales decline is highly signiﬁcant statistically. Thenwe investigate the link between
sales change the importing status of a ﬁrm: indicating intermediate or service importer
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status (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 4, respectively). Both coeﬃcients are positive,
but are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Finally we look at the eﬀect of these all
trade status characteristics in the same time (column 4 of Table 4). We ﬁnd that
exporters‘ sales declined signiﬁcantlymore than non-exporters (2.5 percent) and that
intermediate importers fared somewhat better than non-importers. Those that import
faced a 0.8 percentage point smaller drop in sales than those that do not. Service
imports do not seem to matter.
Table 4: Trading status and sales change
Variables Sales change
All firms All firms All firms All firms
Exporter (dummy) -2.252*** -2.49***
(0.424) (0.439)
Intermediate importer 0.258 0.813*
(dummy) (0.411) (0.427)
Service importer (dummy) 0.139 0.405
(0.651) (0.657)
Observations 14,413 14,412 14,412 14,412
Fixed effects
Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector,
country, size country, size country, size country, size
Model Interval regression Interval regression Interval regression Interval regression
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are weighted by the sampling weights of firms.
Trade fell by more than GDP during the crisis. Manufacturing output and exports
collapsed as the shock caused consumers and ﬁrms to retrench; private demand for
all types of consumption beyond everyday use crashed. The huge gap between trade
and production collapse calls for an explanation. Baldwin et al (2009) oﬀer some
tentative explanations, based on compositional eﬀects: they show the products with
the largest contractions in consumption to represent a large share in trade but a small
share in GDP. The demand shocks to GDP and trade occurred simultaneously and this
coincidencewas enhanced by immediate online adjustments of orders and production
Fact 3 – Exporters contracted more than non-exporters, while importers suﬀered
somewhat less of a decline.
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lines all over the world. It means that the negative impact on sales was larger for
exporters than for non-exporters.
How did the exporter decline vary across countries?We report in Figure 6 the average
sales decline of exporters and non-exporters, estimated separately by countries. We
ﬁnd that exporters‘ sales declined signiﬁcantly more than non-exporters in Austria,
France, Germany and Italy, but not in Hungary, Spain and the UK. One interpretation of
this pattern is that in Hungary, Spain and the UK, there was signiﬁcant domestic
economic disturbance, and non-exporters suﬀered to a similar or even greater extent
than exporters. Obviously, this patternwas aﬀected by diﬀerentmacro shocks– as for
example the domestic demand fell more in Spain and the UK – but as we have
observations for one year only we are not able to separate their eﬀect.
Figure 6: Average sales decline of exporters and non-exporters
In summary, international trade can be away of importing demand shocks and, hence,
greater ﬂuctuations.
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8. A similar mechanism is emphasised by Bergin et al (2009), who show that when US companies outsource the
volatile components of production to Mexico, the eﬀect of a demand shock is dampened in the US andmagniﬁed
in Mexico. At a macro level, Caselli et al (2010) study how productivity shocks are transmitted in a multi-country,
multi-sector trade model.
5 Supply chains and the crisis
While much of the trade collapse was a result of falling ﬁnal demand, imported
intermediate goods intensiﬁed the decline, suggesting that international linkages via
the import of intermediate goods inﬂuenced each country’s exposure to foreign
shocks. The vertical specialisation transmissionmechanism is subtle, value chains –
both national and international – are complex and there are several ways in which
these linkages could generate a signiﬁcant andwidespread collapse in trade. The story
with value chains matters in particular because the crisis hit sectors such as motor
vehicles, which has one of the largest supplier networks.
As we suggest, importers suﬀered less of a decline in sales than non-importers (see
the results in Table 4). Thismay be because they can respond to demand shocksmore
ﬂexibly than ﬁrms that do not have the ability to import8. Becausemore open countries
source their output from more countries, their output may be more stable due to
‘diversiﬁcation through trade’.
The other hypothesis is that vertical linkages maymagnify, not just transmit, shocks
across countries. Using a global input-output framework that links demand to
production via trade ﬂows, Bems et al (2010) argue that as a result of vertical linkages,
world trade declines by three percent when GDP falls by one percent. This argument
suggests that the demand alone (via linkages) can account for 70 percent of the trade
collapse.
In order to understand the details of this mechanism, and to quantify the conse-
quences of intermediate-goods import linkages for the transmission of shocks and
collapse in trade, one option is to measure bilateral imported intermediate-goods
linkages using trade data combinedwith national input-output tables. Levchenko et al
(2010) used a set of upstream and downstream linkage variables developed in di
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Giovanni and Levchenko (2010), and found that reliance on downstream linkages
partly explains the magnitude of decline in certain industries9.
While these authors used diﬀerent databases, concentratingmainly on aggregates or
ﬁrm-level data from one country, the EFIGE database provides an opportunity to use
ﬁrm-level data from diﬀerent countries.
In order to measure how shocks are transmitted along supply chains, we use two
distinct but related concepts of supply linkages. The ﬁrst is based on the technological
features of the ﬁrm’s activity. In particular, if the ﬁrm is producing intermediates used
by other ﬁrms, it is likely to be towards the end of the supply chain, and subject to a
larger set of demand shocks. On the other hand, if the ﬁrm is using a large amount of
intermediates in its production or if it outsources some of its production, it may be
better equipped to ‘unload‘ the demand shocks it faces. We anticipate that these ﬁrms
declined less10.
The second concept of ﬁrm linkages we exploit is based on governance. Firms that
control other ﬁrms may respond more ﬂexibly to a fall in demand than ﬁrms that are
subsidiaries in a larger network. These linkages are often correlatedwith technological
linkages, as downstream ﬁrms are more likely to control upstream ﬁrms.
To measure input-output linkages of the ﬁrm, we follow di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2010).Weﬁrst calculate the fraction of sectoral output that is used as an intermediate
input in other sectors (computed based on national input-output tables). The
complementary share is going to ﬁnal consumers. We also measure the share of
industry revenue spent on intermediate inputs.
We measure the link between the sales change and the ﬁrm’s share of turnover
produced to order, the outsourcing of some of its production, the industry-level
measure of the share of output used as intermediate of other domestic sectors and
9. In terms of the eﬀect of arm’s length trade and oﬀshoring, the evidence is scarce so far. Bernard et al (2009) look
at the Asian crisis and US exports and ﬁnds that the 1998 decline in arm’s length exports (26 percent) was
substantially greater than the drop in trade undertakenwithin supply chains (4 percent). Altomonte and Ottaviano
(2009) argue that within-ﬁrm eﬀects are more moderate given the lack of liquidity problems. Bergin et al (2010)
take a diﬀerent stand and look at outsourcing in a hierarchical fashion. First, the headquarters provide diﬀerent
functions that are less volatile, such as design andmarketing. Second, headquartersmay use aﬃliates to protect
jobs at headquarters.
10. Thismechanism focuses on the transmission of demand shocks.When productivity shocks are the primary source
of ﬂuctuations, downstream ﬁrms may be more vulnerable. See Costinot et al (2011) for a productivity-shock
driven theory of global supply chains.
intermediate usage as a share of output (see Table 5). The ﬁrst two indicators capture
various ways of organising production, the last two control for the technological place
of the ﬁrm in the supply chain. First we assess these four links separately each and
ﬁnally put them together. The estimated results take into account country, industry
and size-class eﬀects.
Table 5: Technological linkages and sales change
Variables Sales change
All firms All firms All firms All firms All firms
Produced-to-order goods share -0.022*** -0.021***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsources some production 1.8* 1.565
(dummy) (0.989) (0.987)
Share of output used as
intermediate of other -0.122*** -0.097**
domestic sectors (0.041) (0.042)
Intermediate use as a share -0.15*** -0.138***
of output (0.035) (0.035)
Observations 14,409 14,413 14,409 14,409 14,405
Fixed effects
Sector, , Sector, , Sector, , Sector, , Sector,
country, size country, size country, size country, size country, size
Model
Interval Interval Interval Interval Interval
regression regression regression regression regression
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are weighted by the sampling weights of firms.
Firms that produce a greater share of their output to order witness a greater drop in
their sales (see column 1 of Table 5). A ﬁrm that produces 100 percent of its output to
order suﬀered a 2.2 percent larger decline in sales. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms outsourcing
part of their production saw smaller declines in their sales during the crisis (Table 5,
column 2). The diﬀerence is 1.8 percentage points.
The eﬀect of input-output linkages is measured at the country/industry level and we
control for both country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimates rely on variation
across countries within the same sector. If the sector sells a 10 percentage points
higher fraction of its output to downstream sectors, the average sales decline is 1.2
percentage points larger (Table 5, column 3).
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Industries (and countries) using more intermediates relative to their output also
contractedmore (Table 5, column4). This is in contrast to the assumption that they can
unload the demand shockmore eﬀectively. One reason could be that these industries
may face diﬀerent demand shocks. This highlights the need to control for demand
shocks, which we do when assess all these eﬀects jointly (Table 5, column 5). The
measured eﬀects are similar to when they were estimated separately, but the eﬀect
of outsourcing loses its statistical signiﬁcance.
There are diﬀerences in sales changes between ﬁrms in diﬀerent parts of corporate
groups (see Table 6 for the results). We denote as ‘controlling ﬁrms’ those ﬁrms that
have aﬃliates or are the head of a network. Similarly, we call ﬁrms that are subordinate
members of a network, or have been acquired by another ﬁrm ‘controlled by others’. As
anticipated, controlling ﬁrms decline less and controlled ﬁrms decline more, but the
diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant. Again, the demand shocks facing these
ﬁrmsmay be diﬀerent.
To control for demand shock, we estimate how the number of employees of the ﬁrm
changeswhen themagnitude of the drop in sales is taken into account. As Fact 2a has
shown, employment changes are a signiﬁcant way of responding to demand shocks.
We capture demand shocks by the categorical variablemeasuring the change in sales
between 2008 and 2009. The reference category is no decline or increase in sales.
We ﬁrst look at the technological place of the ﬁrm in the input-output table. We have
seen previously that ﬁrms selling more intermediates suﬀered a bigger decline in
sales, potentially because they faced a larger demand shock. We next look at how the
control of the ﬁrm aﬀects its response to demand shocks.
Fact 4a – Firms producing a large fraction of their output to order, or selling a large
fraction to other ﬁrms suﬀered a greater decline. outsourcing ﬁrms fared somewhat
better.
Table 6: Firm control and sales change
Variables Sales change
All firms All firms All firms
Controlling firm (dummy) 0.339 0.324
(0.458) (0.458)
Controlled by others (dummy) -0.837 -0.827
(0.564) (0.564)
Observations 14,413 14,413 14,413
Fixed effects Sector, country, size Sector, country, size Sector, country, size
Model Interval regression Interval regression Interval regression
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are weighted by the sampling weights of firms.
The conditional eﬀect of input-output linkages on employment changes, holding the
sales decline ﬁxed, is very small and is not diﬀerent from zero statistically (see
columns 1 through 3 of Table 7). Similarly to what is reported in Table 2, ﬁrms that
suﬀered a 0 to 10 percent sales drop reduced their employment by about four to ﬁve
percent. Firmswith a 10 to 30 percent sales drop reduced employment by about nine
percent. Firms with greater than 30 percent sales drop laid oﬀ 17 percent of their
workers.
Firms that are the head of a network or otherwise have control over other companies,
do not reduce their employment by as much (a positive coeﬃcient means a greater
increase or a lesser reduction – see column 4 of Table 7). For a given level of sales
decline, controlling ﬁrms layoﬀ 1.5 percentage points fewer workers. This may be
because they can better shield their workers by reducing orders to aﬃliates instead.
This interpretation is consistent with the estimate which shows that ﬁrms that are
controlled by others suﬀer a larger employment decline, although the eﬀect is not
statistically signiﬁcant (Table 7, column 5). Finally these results are conﬁrmed when
the eﬀects are estimated jointly (Table 7, column 6).
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Table 7: linkages and labour change
Variables labour change (%)
All firms All firms All firms All firms All firms All firms
Share of output used as
intermediate of other 0.008 0.009
domestic sectors (0.027) (0.027)
Intermediate usage as -0.008 -0.010
a share of output (0.023) (0.023)
Controlling firm 1.509*** 1.5***
(dummy) (0.315) (0.315)
Controlled by others -0.566 -0.524
(dummy) (0.408) (0.40
Reduction in sales up -4.656*** -4.654*** -4.653*** -4.652*** -4.65*** -4.647***
to 10% (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296
Reduction in sales up -8.955*** -8.948*** -8.951*** -8.969*** -8.947*** -8.964***
to 10-30% (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289)
Reduction in sales -17.081*** -17.074*** -17.076*** -17.055*** -17.072*** -17.049***
more than 30% (0.475) (0.475) (0.475) (0.474) (0.475) (0.474)
Observations 13,901 13,901 13,901 13,901 13,901 13,901
R2 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.208 0.207 0.208
Fixed effects
Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector,
country, size country, size country, size country, size country, size country, size
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are weighted by the sampling weights of firms.
If ﬁrms respond to demand shocks diﬀerently based on their position within the
companynetwork, thenwe expect the employment diﬀerence between controlled and
controlling ﬁrms to be greatest when the demand shock is large. Figure 7 plots the
average employment decline as a function of the sales decline separately for ﬁrms
that are not members of a group, for controlling ﬁrms, and for controlled ﬁrms.
Figure 7: Firm control and labour change
Source: EFIGE.
Controlled ﬁrms always reduce their employmentmore than controlling ﬁrms, but this
diﬀerence ismost pronounced for large demand shocks. For ﬁrms that have seen their
sales decline by more than 30 percent, the employment gap between the two types
of ﬁrms is 4.2 percentage points.
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Fact 4b – Firms that control other companies have reduced their employment
relatively less in response to a demand shock of the same size. The employment
diﬀerence is greatest for large demand shocks.
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6 Financial constraints during
the crisis
The evidence regarding ﬁnancing and credit has been limited andmixed.
Mora and Powers (2009) argue that the decline in trade ﬁnancing contributed directly
to the decline in global trade in the second half of 2008 and early 2009. Banks and
suppliers report that trade ﬁnancing is the secondmost important cause of the global
trade slowdown, after falling international demand. Early in the crisis, rising uncertainty
increased demand for some trade ﬁnancing. Demand for export credit insurance rose,
and the insured value rose for capital goods during the crisis.
French data suggests that the crisis had a more severe impact on ﬁrms in industries
relying on external ﬁnance. For some ﬁrms, mainly the small ones, ﬁnancial con-
straintswere found to be a signiﬁcant aggravating factor, as documented byBricongne
et al (2011)11.
The EFIGE survey enables us to estimate the relationship between someﬁrm-level and
industry-level ﬁnancial variables–which all proxy ﬁnancial constraints in a crisis – on
ﬁrmperformance during the crisis. It is widely thought that ﬁnance could have played
an important role during the crisis. Drying liquidity in major ﬁnancial markets was
imminent, but its eﬀect on the corporate sector requires in-depth examination.We look
at the eﬀect of external ﬁnance on sales and exports during the crisis, and investigate
the role of the maturity composition of external ﬁnance. Tangible assets that can be
used as collateral have a positive impact on access to external ﬁnance in normal times.
11. In France, credit-constrained ﬁrms – those that faced a payment problem during the previous 12 months –
experienced a greater drop in exports than those that did not have a payment problem. This existing feature was
reinforced by the crisis. However, themagnitude of these constraints is small and hence cannot explain the severity
of the downturn. In less-developed markets, the eﬀects may have been diﬀerent despite having banking sectors
not suﬀering from a home-grown crisis. Trade credit is found to matter in Africa. Berman and Martin (2011) found
that sub-Saharan countries are more sensitive to partner-country crisis than most developed countries, and
external ﬁnance, especially trade credit, does matter.
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Does this remain the case during a crisis? Finally we ask if diﬀerent types of banks
could have played any role in the eﬀects of the crisis.
External ﬁnance
First let us consider the key indicators of reliance on external ﬁnance. One question in
the EFIGE survey directly asks if the ﬁrmexperienced ﬁnancial constraints in 2008. On
average, 34 percent of ﬁrms answered ‘yes’. The share of constrained ﬁrms was
greatest in Spain (54 percent) and France (49 percent). This variable has a signiﬁcant,
but economically modest, eﬀect on sales decline; sales of ﬁrms experiencing such
constraints were 1.3-1.9 percent smaller (see Table 8).
Another aspect of the ﬁnancial crisis is that it may have created diﬀerences between
ﬁrms that relymore on external ﬁnancing andﬁrmsusing internal ﬁnancing to a greater
extent. Our estimates provide evidence for a negative relationship between external
ﬁnancing and sales growth. Firms relying on external ﬁnance lost about 1.2 percent
more of sales.
About 12 percent of ﬁrms in the sample used export credit asmeans to ﬁnance trade.
When we used this variable in the regression only, we found some signiﬁcant results.
However, whenmore controls of ﬁnancial positionwere added, we found no correlation
between the use of trade credits and decline in export sales.
Results on the eﬀect of the composition of external debt suggest that it was only the
reliance onmediumand long-termbank debt that becameproblematic during the crisis
(see Table 9). However, its economic impactwas rather small; 40 percentmedium/long
term debt reduces sales by amere one percent.
Fact 5a – Firms relying on external ﬁnance and experiencing ﬁnancial constraints
to growth (before the crisis) experienced a greater sales decline. The use of trade
credits by itself did not prove to be a signiﬁcant factor.
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Table 8: Eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints
Variables Sales Exports
All firms All firms All firms All firms
Firm perceived financial -1.261*** -1.47*** -1.921**
constraints (0.408) (0.41) (0.784)
Firm recurring to external -1.19*** -1.199*** 0.015
financing (0.404) (0.406) (0.766)
Exporter (dummy) -2.484*** -2.395***
(0.415) (0.427)
Export credit (dummy) 1.946* 1.251
(1.088) (1.188)
Constant 9.9*** 11.949*** 1.525 3.556
(1.527) (1.414) (2.747) (2.85)
Observations 11,604 11,604 7,523 6,199
R2 0.043 0.047
McKelvey-Zavoina R2 0.079 0.076
Dummies Sector, Sector, Sector, c Sector,
country, size country, size country, size country, size
Model Interval regression Interval regression OLS OLS
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are weighted by the sampling weights of firms.
Estimation models andmethods are explained in Appendix C and D, respectively.
Table 9: Financial liability structure of ﬁrms
Variables Sales
Firms with external financing All firms
Fin. structure: medium/long term -0.024** -0.030***
bank debt, % (0.010) (0.010)
Other financing, % -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011)
Firm recurring to external 0.388
financing (0.919)
Firm perceived financial -1.525 -1.258***
constraints (0.604) (0.407)
Exporter (dummy) -0.948 -2.515***
(0.656) (0.415)
Constant 8.755*** 9.925***
(3.069) (1.526)
Observations 4763 11604
McKelvey-Zavoina R2 0.0956 0.0792
Dummies Sector, country, size Sector, country, size
Model Interval regression Interval regression
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are weighted by
the sampling weights of firms.
Assets
Uncertainty in ﬁnancial markets also leads to a diﬀerence between sectors withmore
tangible assets, which may be used as collateral, compared to sectors with fewer
tangible assets.
Balance sheet data were used for those ﬁrms for which the EFIGE and AMADEUS data
could bemerged. Note that this was feasible for France, Hungary, Italy and Spain only.
We conﬁrm the proposition of Chor andManova (2009), which suggests that ﬁrmswith
a greater pre-crisis tangible assets (ie property) to total assets ratio suﬀered from
declining valuations of these assets, and the lack of ﬁnancing led to lower sales and
exports (see Table 10). The argument that having large loans backed up by property
turned out to be a curse in the crisis is also supported by the European data. This is true
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after controlling for other size and ﬁnancial-health variables, such as total assets and
cash ﬂow.
Table 10: Eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints based on balance-sheet data
Variables Sales
All firms Exporters
Tangible fixed assets per total assets -5.931*** -7.129***
(1.307) (1.613)
Total assets per sales 1.204*** 1.11***
(0.245) (0.272)
EBIT per sales 2.365 -0.324
(2.871) (3.328)
Cash-flow per sales 4.250 5.817
(3.214) (3.725)
Sales per employees -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Export dummy (broad) -1.143**
(0.547)
Constant 9.906* 6.171
(5.773) (6.177)
Ln Sigma 2.876*** 2.872***
(0.013) (0.016)
Observations 6,671 4,611
McKelvey-Zavoina R2 0.091 0.086
Dummies Country, size Country, size
Model Interval regression Interval regression
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are weighted by the sampling weights of firms.
Estimation models andmethods are explained in Appendix C and D, respectively.
Similarly to other variables, exports fell disproportionally for ﬁrmshaving suchﬁnancial
constraints.
Fact 5b – Firms with a larger pre-crisis tangible asset (eg property) to total asset
ratios suﬀered from declining valuations of these assets, and the consequent lack
of ﬁnancing led to lower sales and exports.
Banks and transmission of the crisis
The survey includes a number of other ﬁrm-speciﬁc questions about ﬁnancing in
general, such as ﬁrms’ use of short-term ﬁnance and choice of bank. In the
questionnaire, ﬁrms were asked what sort of banks they used for their domestic and
foreign operations, selecting one or more out of three types: local, domestic national
and foreign. They could also select how many diﬀerent banks they use overall. Thus,
we added these variables to the usual sales regression.
Results suggest that only having local banks aﬀected sales negatively (see Table 11).
This is true when all variables are used (columns 1 and 3) and also true when
comparing ﬁrms that use only local bankswith others (column2). It is not only true at
the domestic level, but also true for foreign operations of exporters; exports fell by
over 2 percent for ﬁrmswith local-bank ﬁnance. This suggests that crisis transmission
to manufacturing ﬁrms did not really come through major international banks, but
rather through smaller domestic banks. These banks play an important role in most
countries, with the exception of Hungary and the UK. Looking at the country level, this
negative impact is large andnegative in Italy, smaller and negative in France and Spain,
and zero elsewhere.
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Fact 5c – having local banks as their main ﬁnancers aﬀected ﬁrms’ sales
negatively, in particularly in Italy but also in France and Spain.
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Table 11: use of banks
Variables Sales
All firms All firms Exporters
Domestic local banks -1.828*** -2.084***
(0.432) (0.52)
Domestic national banks 0.082 0.143
(0.456) (0.565)
Foreign banks 0.776 0.539
(0.606) (0.862)
Domestic local banks only -1.162***
(0.421)
Number of banks 0.18** 0.125 0.249***
(0.086) (0.083) (0.096)
Exporter (dummy) -2.202*** -2.122***
(0.377) (0.374)
Constant 10.602*** 10.074*** 7.364***
(1.457) (1.438) (1.681)
Observations 14285 14314 9,545
McKelvey-Zavoina R2 0.0807 0.0801 0.0710
Dummies Sector, country, size Sector, country, size Sector, country, size
Model Interval regression Interval regression Interval regression
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are weighted by the sampling weights of firms.
Estimation models andmethods are explained in Appendix C and D, respectively.
In summary, our results indicate that ﬁnancing opportunities mattered for ﬁrms
attempting to copewith the crisis. A number of ﬁrms reported the presence of ﬁnancial
constraints, especially in France and Spain. Sales of ﬁrms that were less reliant on
external ﬁnancing declined less. Finally, the extent to which the ﬁrms’ tangible assets
could be used for collateral seems to have had a negative impact on ﬁrm growth.
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7 Fiscal policy and the crisis
Governments reacted swiftly to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and relaxed budgets sub-
stantially. As well as letting automatic stabilisers go to work, public procurement
programmes were extended. According to OECD (2010), infrastructure spending in
stimulus packages equalled €18 billion in Germany alone. Furthermore, as early as
December 2008, the European Commission accelerated procurement procedures for
all major public projects for 2009 and 2010 (European Commission, 2008). For more
details for the auto industry, see Box 2.
Evidence of the impact of various ﬁscal measures on ﬁrm performance is not widely
available, as most research has either focused on the crisis from a macro-economic
point of view (such as Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2011), or had no access to data on
BoX 2: loANS, GrANTS AND CASh-For-CluNKErS To SuPPorT ThE moTor
VEhIClE INDuSTry
In the car industry, severalmeasureswere introduced because it was directly hit by
the crisis. EU initiatives included increasing the demand for cars: cash-for-clunkers
programmes, public procurement and the setting aside of funds to ﬁnance
reorganisation of the car industry. In 2009, the European Investment Bank increased
the available credit to be used to €7 billion.
Germany spent €1.5 billion on cash-for-clunkers, and the bailout of Opel may have
reached€4billion. In France, at the beginning of 2009, themanufacturerswere given
a loan of €6 billion plus a set of subsidies; the cost of cash-for-clunkers totalled €0.6
billion. In Spain the package of diﬀerent measures totalled €4.1 billion with cash-
for-clunkers of €100million. In the UK €2.3 billion in credit was granted to suppliers
and car producers to support investments in environmentally friendly car
production. More than half of this sum came from the European Investment Bank.
The cash-for-clunkers programme was in the order of €120 million. In Italy the
package of diﬀerent measures totalled €2.5 billion including a cash-for-clunkers
programme.
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public clients. Röger and in’t Veld (2010) usedmodel simulations to suggest a greater
role for ﬁscal policy in credit crises.
During the Great Recession, state involvement in crisis management was rather
widespread in OECD countries as governments reacted to the sharp GDP declines
experienced in 2009. GDP fell by 2-7 percent inmost EU countries, with some countries
such as Greece, Ireland and Latvia experiencing a drop of 10-20 percent of GDP.
Governments reacted with unprecedented ﬁscal relaxation to save their economies
from collapse. As shown in Figure 8, the largest expansionwas carried out in Germany
and theUK followed by Austria. Signiﬁcantly smaller relative amountswere committed
in France, Italy and Spain, while Hungary enacted no ﬁscal stimulus and actually
tightened its overall ﬁscal stance in 2009 as the country tried to weather a sudden
halt to external ﬁnancing and relied on an early bail-out by the IMF and the European
Union.
Figure 8: Fiscal stimuli in 2009, % of GDP
Source: Röger and in’t Veld (2010).
Relaxed ﬁscal policies and public programmes have helped to stabilise demand in two
ways that we can detect in our data. First, countries that were in a good ﬁscal position
before the crisis, such as Austria, France and Germany, could expand easily and
without an increase in yields, and thus help stabilise the economy. In these countries,
ﬁrms were hurt less while exporters experienced a relatively greater decline owing to
worse performance of foreign markets.
In countries that could not expand because of a home-grown crisis, as in Hungary and
Spain, sales of non-exporting ﬁrms declined along with those of exporters. Hungary
was in the worst shape and ﬁrms on average realised the greatest losses among the
seven countries. The UK is special as sterling could be allowed to depreciate against
other currencies thus helping goods exporters.
Our results may capture the broad evidence of diﬀerences between countries only.
They are obtained by relating ﬁrm-level sales with a set of country, industry and size
dummies and the interactions of country dummies with the exporter dummy (see
Table 12). Note that Austria is the base category. These results suggest the largest
country eﬀects in Italy, Hungary and Spain, while the largest deviation of exporting
ﬁrms is found in Austria, France and Germany, and there are no eﬀects in Hungary,
Spain and the UK.
Table 12: Country eﬀects in sales and exports
Country Country effects on sales Exporters’ performance
relative to non-exporters
Austria 0 -12.111***
Germany -2.082 -8.615***
UK -3.058** -0.079
France -5.574*** -6.857***
Italy -7.375*** -3.986***
Hungary -9.377*** -1.961
Spain -13.307*** 0.338
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In column one, we report values of country dummies in a summary regression of sales change on selected variables.
In column two, we report coefficients fromsevenOLS regression of sales change on an exporter dummy. (Industry, size
controls included.)
Observations are weighted by the sampling weights of firms.
The second body of evidence comes directly from the EFIGE survey data. In the survey,
ﬁrmswere asked if they had private and/or public-sector clients. Public-sector clients
may include national or local government and other state-owned institutions. Firms
with clients from the public sector managed on average with a six percent smaller
decline in sales (see Table 13).
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Fact 6a – Fiscal policy may help to mitigate the eﬀects of crises on ﬁrms, while
home-brewed crises (such as in hungary and Spain) will substantially reduce sales.
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12. Coeﬃcients are calculated from individual country regressions including industry and size dummies as well as
several other controls relating to competition and clients. Results are available on request.
Interestingly for ﬁve of the seven countries, the estimated coeﬃcient does not vary
greatly, ranging between5.8 percent and7.5 percent. However, for theUKandHungary,
being a public client helped marginally (1-2 percent) only. There may be several
explanations for this diﬀerence. In the case of Hungary, ﬁscal tighteningmeant that the
public sector could not aﬀord to play a cushioning role. In the UK, the ﬁscal stimulus
itself was half the size of Germany‘s and its composition was more focused on loans
and tax cuts (CRS, 2009, pp 141-142). Also, the public sector in the UK is smaller than
in continental Europe12.
Another possible eﬀect of government orders on ﬁrms is that they may come with
strings attached, probably forcing ﬁrms to lay oﬀ fewer workers. To check this
possibility, we ran regressions with employment change as a dependent variable,
including the public-sector clients dummy, and controlling for sales decline. The public-
sector clients dummy, however, is not signiﬁcant in these regressions. This supports
a hypothesis that governmentswere somewhat eﬀective in boosting demand for ﬁrms
with public-sector customers, but this did not have any extra eﬀects on employment
beyond the indirect eﬀect of greater sales.
Fact 6b – Firms with public-sector clients suﬀered less of a sales decline, but this
eﬀect was weak in hungary and in the uK.
Table 13: Clients and competitors
Variables Sales
Full sample Austria France Germany Hungary Italy Spain UK
Intra-group clients 0.478 1.976 -0.023 -0.608 -1.685 1.682 3.257* 1.735
dummy (0.601) (2.750) (1.119) (1.184) (2.938) (1.643) (1.696) (1.480)
Public administration 5.625*** 7.222** 5.795*** 6.272*** 1.578 7.508*** 6.66*** 2.062*
clients dummy (0.519) (2.892) (0.826) (1.186) (3.177) (1.427) (1.349) (1.151)
Outsource production 1.945** -6.570 0.912 1.550 1.039 2.183 4.473 4.402*
dummy (0.961) (5.025) (1.691) (2.199) (7.958) (1.918) (3.314) (2.598)
Share of production -0.025*** -0.082** -0.026* -0.035*** 0.034 -0.018 -0.002 -0.037**
to order (0.006) (0.034) (0.016) (0.010) (0.041) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Share if imported 0.017* 0.034 0.018 0.002 0.067* 0.004 0.049** 0.025
intermediates (0.010) (0.050) (0.016) (0.024) (0.037) (0.020) (0.025) (0.032)
Competitors from -1.381*** -6.831** 0.210 -2.928*** 0.459 -1.243 -0.346 -1.989*
EU dummy (0.422) (2.718) (0.875) (0.915) (2.290) (0.902) (1.041) (1.188)
Exporter (dummy) -1.569*** -8.986*** -2.811*** -4.563*** -0.888 -0.604 1.087 0.834
(0.413) (3.454) (0.868) (0.862) (2.329) (0.912) (0.995) (1.173)
Constant 10.167*** 22.792*** 4.736*** 9.918*** -6.412 6.875*** -3.539 9.253***
(1.686) (5.826) (1.550) (1.257) (4.752) (2.064) (1.727) (2.621)
Ln Sigma 2.903*** 2.654*** 2.837*** 2.895*** 2.904*** 2.899*** 2.903*** 2.923***
(0.010) (0.069) (0.022) (0.022) (0.052) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028)
Observations 12.804 248 2.537 2.894 449 2.819 2.204 1.653
McKelvey-Zavoina R2 0.086 0.191 0.097 0.098 0.059 0.077 0.093 0.055
Dummies Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector,
size, country size size size size size size size
Model Interval reg. Interval reg. Interval reg. Interval reg. Interval reg. Interval reg. Interval reg. Interval reg.
Source: EFIGE. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are weighted by the sampling weights of firms.
Estimation models andmethods are explained in Appendix C and D, respectively.
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8 Conclusions for policymakers
Our report has found signiﬁcant heterogeneity among ﬁrms, industries and countries
in terms of how they responded to the crisis. While the typical ﬁrm experienced
declining sales and had to shed workers, this was by no means ubiquitous. Policy-
makers can learn fromstudying the experience of ﬁrms that were relatively successful
in weathering the crisis.
This heterogeneity also suggests that one-size-ﬁts-all policies might be ineﬀective.
Understanding the patterns emerging from this heterogeneity may enable govern-
ments to better target spending and regulations.
Short-time work in Europemay be the right instrument to dampen the eﬀect of crises
on employment. This report ﬁnds no support for this. Moreover, our data suggests that
temporary workers were ﬁred ﬁrst, with ﬁrms with larger pools of temporary workers
actually sheddingmore employees. Skill-composition seems tomattermore, as ﬁrms
with less-skilledworkers shedmore jobs than thosewithmorewhite-collar and skilled
blue-collar labour. Firms prioritised the retention of human capital embodied in skilled
labour during the crisis. As companies tend to retain their core employees, policy
should help reallocate and retrain the others.
Regarding the role of exports, our evidence is in line with earlier ﬁndings; exports fell
more than sales in most countries. Reducing imports and relying on outsourcing
oﬀered ﬂexibility that helped mitigate the crisis and helped maintain sales and
employment. National policies should not fear a sudden disappearance of trade
contacts; the key adjustment is taking place within the ﬁrm. Also, larger ﬁrms will be
able to adjust through imports and outsourcing, hence, trade protection is not a helpful
solution.
Dominant ﬁrms centrally placed in the technology, trade and ownership network fared
better. Firms producing ﬁnal goods and relying on a stable pool of skilled workers had
more success maintaining their sales. Making speciﬁc products ordered by large
customers may result in greater sales reductions. Similarly, relying on a network of
suppliers could also mitigate the eﬀect of the crisis. Finally, ﬁrms controlling other
companies at home or abroad could preserve more jobs. This suggests that in such
crises, policy should focus on helping stabilise ﬁrms that are in weaker positions,
owned by foreign ﬁrms and producing less skill-intensive and/or speciﬁc products for
large customers.
This raises an important policy trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, while export-oriented
strategies may improve competitiveness, they also bring about greater exposure to
foreign crises. Accessing foreign markets may help ﬁrms attain bigger scale, achieve
greater productivity or upgrade their products in stable times, but such ﬁrms, sectors
and countries will also be more vulnerable to crises.
The ﬂip side of the same trade-oﬀ is that outsourcing to other countries has distinct
stabilisation beneﬁts.Whilemany see competition by lower-wage countries as a threat,
it should also be clear that these supply chain linkages give greater ﬂexibility when
responding to a demand shock. These additional gains from trade for rich countries
imply that protectionist instincts during the crisis may bemisguided.
Anecdotal evidence suggested that as banks collapsed, trade credit dried up andhence
exports fell more sharply than output. Yet, earlier studies found mixed evidence
regarding the eﬀect of trade ﬁnance. This report falls in line with other papers, ﬁnding
no convincing result. As trade credit was not itself a major reason for export decline,
policy should consider a broader set of ﬁnancing options. However, we can conﬁrm
the importance of pre-crisis external constraints, and add that a greater reliance on
external ﬁnance had a negative impact on sales during the crisis. It was detected that
the ﬁnancial crisis aﬀected ﬁrms not through major international banks but through
smaller and ﬁnancially weaker local banks. Of course, this may have been a result of
government intervention shoring up the capital positions of some large and important
banks. Whichever is the case, strengthening local banks may help ﬁrms to cope with
the consequences of the crisis.
While ﬁscal policy was the main policy tool used by governments, with sizeable new
government purchases from the private sector, evidence on the role of the state is
limited. The general ﬁscal policy stance and the role of public-sector orders from
companies are found to help mitigate declining sales.
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Appendix A: the EFIGE survey
and its variables
The ﬁrm level data used in this report are drawn from the EFIGE survey, collectedwithin
the project EFIGE – European Firms in a Global Economy: internal policies for external
competitiveness. For this report, the EFIGE data was complemented by balance sheet
data drawn from the Amadeus databasemanaged by Bureau van Dyck. The question-
naire is mainly focused on 2008, with some questions on ﬁrmsí activity in 2009 and
in previous years. It contains a rich section on internationalisation as well as
organisation of the ﬁrm, labour and ﬁnance. Crisis indicator variables were asked
directly, such as how did sales or export change in 2009 compared with 2008.
The number of ﬁrms that answered the EFIGE questionnaire is reported in Table A1.
The sample includes around 3,000 ﬁrms for France, Italy and Spain, more than 2,200
for UK andGermany, and500each for Austria andHungary. In the Appendixwe provide
the distribution of the sample by sector and size class for each country.
Appendix Table A.1: Number of sampled firms by country
Country Number of firms
Austria 344
France 2759
Germany 2935
Hungary 486
Italy 3021
Spain 2832
UK 2067
Total 14444
Source: EFIGE Survey dataset. NB these are firms for which the manufacturing sector codes are broadly available.
316 firms have been dropped.
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Variables and modiﬁcations
Variables used in this policy report have been chosen to allow themaximumpossible
comparability across countries and industries. Hence, somemodiﬁcationsweremade:
– in several cases, dummy variables on a given activity were modiﬁed by imputing
zero instead of NA/DK. This was used for simple variables such FDI dummy or
exporting;
– the method of imputing zeros was not used for ‘opinion’ questions such as asking
if the ﬁrmhas ﬁnancial constraints. Hence, the number of observationsmaybewell
below 14K for some regressions;
– when for some ﬁrms percentage, while for others actual values were available (ie
skill levels of labour), percent values were uniformly created to allow comparison;
– for exporters, we have detailed data for 7738ﬁrms. The export dummy is 1 for 9460
ﬁrms given the broad deﬁnition is used.
Since the sample is not fully representative as it overweights certain sectors and ﬁrm
size categories, sampling weights were constructed in terms of size-sector cells to
make the sample representative of the underlying population – for each of the
countries. All the analysis of the report is based on the weighted sample.
Appendix Table A.2: Variables from EFIGE Survey
Dependent variables
Variable used Definition
Changes in sales (modes) Change of sales (turnover) in 2009 compared to 2008. Multiple
outcome variable. Equals 0 if sales rose or were unchanged, 1
for small (0-10%) decline, 2 for moderate (10-30%) decline and
3 for large decline (30%+)
Change in exports Change of exports in 2009 compared to 2008, in percent.
Measured for those reported exports in 2008.
Change in employment Change of labour from 2009 to 2008, in %.
Change in employment (modes) Change of labour in 2009 compared to 2008. Multiple outcome
variable. Equals 0 if employment rose or was unchanged, 1 for
small (0-10%) decline, 2 for moderate (10-30%) decline and 3
for large decline (30%+) in employment.
Explanatory variables
Competitors from EU dummy Dummy for firm having competitors from the EU
Controlled by others (dummy) Dummy for controlling other firms as head of a group or having
affiliates
Controlling firm (dummy) Dummy for controlled by other firms: affiliate or acquired or is
controlled by other firms as part of a group
Domestic local banks Dummy for firm has finance from local domestic bank(s), such
as regional thrifts
Domestic local banks only Dummy for firm has finance from local domestic bank(s) only
Domestic national banks Dummy for firm has finance from national domestic bank(s)
Export credit (dummy) Dummy for firms having a significant share of exports financed
by export credit
Exporter (dummy) Dummy for exporter - wide definition: firm is direct exporter in
2008 or has been actively exporting in years before 2008. For
exporters, we have detail data for 7738 firms. The export_wide
dummy is 1 for 9460 firms given the broad definition used.
Fin. structure: medium/long term Financial structure: medium/long term bank debt, % in 2008
bank debt, %
Fin. structure: medium/long term Financial structure: medium/long term securities, % in 2008
securities, %
Fin. structure: short term bank debt, % Financial structure: short term bank debt, % in 2008
Fin. Structure: short-term securities, % Financial Structure: short-term securities, % in 2008
Firm perceived financial constraints Dummy for firm perceived financial constraints (pre-crisis)
Firm recurring to external financing Dummy, Reply to: firm recurring to external financing in (pre-
crisis)
Foreign banks Dummy for firm has finance from foreign bank(s)
Intermediate importer (dummy) Dummy for importer of rawmaterials and/or intermediate goods
in 2008
Intermediate use share Use of intermediate goods (domestic and import) as a share of
output
Intra-group clients dummy Dummy, the firms have clients who are affiliated (part of the
same group)
Number of banks The number of banks the firm has financing from
Outsource production dummy Dummy for the firm that has outsourced production
Outsources some production (dummy) Dummy, Outsources some production
Part-time employees (%) Part time employees share in total labour (%)
Produced-to-order goods share Produced-to-order (specifically made for selected clients)
Share of production to order goods share to total output
Public administration clients dummy Dummy for having public administration clients
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Service importer (dummy) Dummy for importer of services in 2008
Share of output used as intermediate of Share of output used as intermediate of other domestic sectors
other domestic sectors
Share of skilled blue collars (%) Skilled blue collar employees share in total labour (%)
Share of white collars & executives (%) White collar and executive employees share in total labour (%)
Appendix Table A.3: Variables from Amadeus database
Variable used Definition
Tangible_Assets_share Share of tangible assets in total assets
Assets_to_sales Assets to sales ratio
EBIT_to_sales Earnings before interest and tax to sales ratio
Sales_to_employees Sales per employees ratio
Available for Spain, Italy, France, Hungary only
Appendix Table A.4: Sector/country specific variables
Variable usedDefinition
Upstream_share Intermediate use as a share of output is a (2-digit) industry-
country level variable. Defined as in di Giovanni-Levchenko
(2010) using national input-output (Supply) tables of 2007
from Eurostat (2005 for Hungary).
Downstream_share Share of inputs used as intermediate of other domestic sectors
is a (2-digit) industry-country level variable. Defined as in di
Giovanni-Levchenko (2010) using national input-output (Sup-
ply) tables of 2007 from Eurostat, (2005 for Hungary).
Appendix B: descriptive tables
Appendix Table B.1: reaction of firms to the crisis
Sales in 2009 compared to 2008 Observations Share Mean
no reduction/increase 4,183 28.4%
small reduction (0-10) 2,810 19.1%
moderate reduction (10-30%) 5,061 34.4%
large reduction (30%+) 2,675 18.2%
Total 14,729 100% -12.3%
Change of export volume in
Observations Share
Conditional mean
2009 vs 2008 increase/decrease
Increased 1,456 18.9% 23.6%
No change 2,240 29.0%
Reduced 4,028 52.2% -30.8%
Total 7,724 100.00% -11.6%
Change of labour in
Observations Share
Conditional mean
2009 vs 2008 increase/decrease
increased 1,905 13.4% 11.9%
no change 5,778 40.6%
reduced 6,561 46.1% -16.9%
Total 14,244 100% -6.2%
Mode of labour change Observations Share
No Change 6,135 41.7%
Temporal Change 1,705 11.6%
Permanent Change 6,890 46.8%
Total 14,730 100%
Recurring to external financing in 2008-2009 Observations Share
Recur 6,344 44.7%
No recur 7,856 55.3%
Total 14,200 100%
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Appendix C: models used
When testing our hypotheses, we rely on the EFIGE survey database, collected within
the project EFIGE – European Firms in a Global Economy: internal policies for external
competitiveness. For this report, the EFIGE data has been complemented by balance
sheet data drawn from the Amadeus database. The questionnaire ismainly focused on
2008, with somequestions on ﬁrmsí activity in 2009 and in previous years. It contains
a rich section on internationalisation as well as organisation of the ﬁrm, labour and
ﬁnance.
Several indicators directly related to the crisis had been asked directly. One such
question, central to this study was ‘How did sales change in 2009 compared with
2008?‘. Similar questions were asked on exports and employment, too.
The sample includes around 3,000 ﬁrms from each of France, Italy and Spain, more
than 2,200 from each of Germany and the UK, and 500 from each of Austria and
Hungary. In Appendix A we provide a description of the variables, and document the
distribution of the sample by sector and size class for each country.
When testing the hypotheses we rely on a number of descriptive statistics as well as
on two types of regressions. The ﬁrst type of regression investigates the variables
related to the unconditional decline in sales (or exports) suﬀered by each ﬁrm. For
example, a positive coeﬃcient of a dummy representing exporters suggests that sales
of exporting ﬁrmsdeclined to a smaller extent than sales of non-exporting similar ﬁrms
in the same industry.
The second regression model investigates how diﬀerently ﬁrms reacted in terms of
their employment assuming a similar sized demand shock. For example, we
considered if some ﬁrms were less likely to lay oﬀ workers, conditioning on sales
decline. For example, the positive coeﬃcient of white collar workers in a regression,
when adjusting for diﬀerences in the demand shock suggests that ﬁrms employing
more such workers will tend to lay oﬀ fewer workers.
In all our models, every variable is speciﬁed in percentage terms, ranging between -
100 percent and 100 percent, where a 100 percent change indicates doubling of
sales (or exports, employment) and -100 percent means exit. The models are
described in Box 3.
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BoX 3: moDElS uSED
The ﬁrst type of regression used in this reportmodels sales decline unconditionally.
These regressions take the following form:
Change in salesi = Xiβ + Diγ + εi
where i denotes ﬁrms,Xi is a vector of diﬀerent ﬁrm-level variables andDi is a set
of country, 2-digit industry and size dummies. The EFIGE survey did not include exact
turnover data for 2008-2009. Instead it asked ﬁrms by what extent sales changed
from2008 to 2009. Change of sales (turnover) from2008 to 2009 is thus amultiple
outcome variable, equalling 0 if sales rose or were unchanged, 1 for small (0-10
percent) decline, 2 for moderate (10-30 percent) decline and 3 for large decline
(>30 percent). To use asmuch information as possible when estimating themodel,
we rely on amaximum likelihood technique called interval regression. We provide a
short description of thismethod in Appendix D. When implementing this procedure,
we transform the dependent variable in such a way that it shows change in sales in
percentage from -100 to 100. A positive value shows increase in sales.
The second type of regression investigates which ﬁrms are more likely to lay oﬀ
workers, holding demand shock constant. In this case the dependent variable is
employment change, while we control for sales decline (as a set of dummies):
Change in employmenti = Xiβ + Diγ + Siδ + εi
where Si denotes the set of sales change dummies. Fortunately ﬁrms reported
employment change in percentages, thus these regressions can be estimated by
OLS.
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Appendix D: estimation
methodology
In this report, two types of estimation methods are used, an interval regression for
change in sales and labour and OLS for change in exports.
The EFIGE survey did not include exact turnover data for 2008-2009. Instead it asked
ﬁrms by what extent sales changed from 2008 to 2009. Change of sales (turnover)
from2008 to 2009 is hence,multiple outcome variables. Equals 0 if sales rose or were
unchanged, 1 for small (0-10 percent) decline, 2 formoderate (10-30 percent) decline
and 3 for large decline (>30 percent).
Average decline in sales values was estimated using sales intervals (see previous
section). For closed intervals we used simple mid-points (-0.05 for decline of 0-10
percent, and -0.2 for 10-30 percent drop). Using the Amadeus dataset, we estimated
values for open intervals (0.4 for decline of 30 percent and above and -0.1 for zero and
below) and used these mid-points to calculate sample averages.
In order tomeasure the eﬀect of various ﬁrm level variables on sales, we used interval
regressions. This is diﬀerent to using ordered probit in that here, we need not estimate
cut-oﬀ points as they are given by the data collection scheme. Indeed, interval
regression can be deﬁned as an ordered probit with cut points ﬁxed and with co-
eﬃcients and variance estimated bymaximum likelihood (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 509).
The advantage is that estimates can nowbe interpreted as if they came fromanOLS13.
A similar method was applied for change in the labour. Here we used a set of survey
questions to construct a similar set of values and use interval regressions as well.
For change in export values, a simple OLS was used with a dependent variable given
as percentage change of exports in 2009 compared to 2008, also constructed from
several survey questions.
13. Another option would be to provide mid-points directly rather than using ML estimates. Our results are robust to
using this methodology as well as ordered probit in lieu of interval regressions.
For regressions a set of dummy variables were used to denote 2-digit NACE1.1
industries, countries and ﬁrmsize. The survey used four ﬁrm size categories that were
kept in this report: “10-19 employees”, “20-49 employees”, “50-249 employees” and
“250 employees andmore”.
Interval regressions
In order tomeasure the eﬀect of various ﬁrm level variables on sales, we used interval
regressions. An interval regression can be deﬁned as an ordered probit with cut points
ﬁxed andwith coeﬃcients and variance estimated bymaximum likelihood (Wooldridge
2002, p. 509).
The estimation of interval models by maximum likelihood, introduced by Stewart
(1983) is relatively straightforward and has been applied in a number of contexts
estimating willingness to pay models. The data generating process for the eﬀect on
crisis is assumed to be
y*i = xiβ + εi
where sales change is denoted by y*i but it is not directly observed. Instead what we
observed are values that refer to intervals in value for i intervals (in our case i=4),
denoted by
mi ≤ y*i ≤ Mi
Note that intervals may be unbounded either at minimum or maximum (i.e. denoting
cases like 30 percent and above). Once we assume normality, we can compute the
log likelihood for an observation:
Mi − xiβ mi − xiβ
li (β,σ) = lnP (mi ≤ y*i ≤ Mi) = ln [ Φ (––––––––) −Φ (––––––––)]σ σ
The likelihood-ratio chi-squared tests the diﬀerence between the full model (with
predictors) and the constant onlymodel. TheMcKelvey-Zavoina pseudoR2 is computed
using the variances of the latent variable and the latent predicted variable. Further, we
use a simple correlation between the predicted and observed values as a simple
goodness of ﬁt measure applied frequently. The ancillary statistic of σ is basically
the same as the standard error of estimate in OLS regression.
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